Admin Authentication

GenAI Smart Router separates caller API authentication from browser-admin authentication.

Router caller tokens authenticate applications and CLI users for /v1/* model APIs.
Metrics-admin caller tokens read /metrics.
HTTP Basic can establish a simple browser-admin identity for /admin/* routes.
OIDC can establish browser-admin identity through an enterprise identity provider and a server-side session cookie.
Casbin authorization is the policy decision layer for metrics and admin-report permissions. See Admin Authorization.

HTTP Basic and OIDC are disabled by default and can be enabled independently. Basic is useful for simple self-hosted deployments and bootstrap access. OIDC is intended for deployments that want browser administrators to authenticate through an identity provider such as Google Workspace.

Basic Auth Configuration

Use a bcrypt password hash stored in deployment secrets or environment variables:

server:
  admin_auth:
    basic:
      enabled: true
      realm: GenAI Smart Router Admin
      allow_insecure_http: false
      trusted_proxy_cidrs:
        - 127.0.0.1/32
      users:
        - username: admin
          password_hash_env: SMART_ROUTER_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH
          subject: basic:admin
          domain: example/prod
          permissions:
            - admin:auth:read

password_hash_env names an environment variable that contains the bcrypt hash. Do not put plaintext passwords in router config.

trusted_proxy_cidrs controls whether the router honors X-Forwarded-Proto: https from a reverse proxy. Leave it empty unless the router is behind a proxy you control, and set it only to that proxy's network or host address.

For local loopback testing only, set allow_insecure_http: true:

server:
  admin_auth:
    basic:
      enabled: true
      realm: Local Router Admin
      allow_insecure_http: true
      trusted_proxy_cidrs: []
      users:
        - username: admin
          password_hash_env: SMART_ROUTER_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH
          subject: basic:admin
          domain: local/dev
          permissions:
            - admin:auth:read

Generate a hash with an operating-system package or a trusted admin tool. One Python example:

python3 - <<'PY'
import bcrypt
password = b"replace-with-a-strong-password"
print(bcrypt.hashpw(password, bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12)).decode())
PY

Install the hash as a deployment secret or environment variable before the router starts:

export SMART_ROUTER_ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH='$2b$12$replaceWithTheGeneratedHash'

OIDC Session Configuration

OIDC uses Authorization Code flow with PKCE. The router verifies the ID token with provider discovery and JWKS, validates state and nonce, then creates a server-side session cookie. The browser receives only the session cookie; raw OIDC tokens are not returned by admin auth responses.

server:
  admin_auth:
    oidc:
      enabled: true
      issuer_url: https://accounts.google.com
      client_id_env: GOOGLE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID
      client_secret_env: GOOGLE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET
      redirect_url: https://router.example.com/admin/auth/callback
      scopes:
        - email
        - profile
      allowed_domains:
        - example.com
      groups_claim: groups
      email_claim: email
      subject_claim: email
      domain: example/prod
    sessions:
      cookie_name: smart_router_admin_session
      ttl: 8h
      secure_cookies: true
      same_site: strict

Register https://router.example.com/admin/auth/callback with the IdP. Keep client_id_env and client_secret_env as environment-variable names and store the actual values in deployment secrets.

For Google Workspace, use issuer https://accounts.google.com, restrict allowed_domains to the approved Workspace domains, and grant Casbin roles to stable subjects such as user:alice@example.com. Standard Google ID tokens do not always include group membership; use explicit policy unless a governed groups claim is configured and validated for the deployment.

Runtime Behavior

GET /admin/auth/check is a protected stub endpoint for validating the first admin identity path.

Condition	Result
Basic Auth disabled	`404`
Missing or invalid credentials	`401` with `WWW-Authenticate`
Valid credentials without route permission	`403 admin-forbidden`
Valid credentials with `admin:auth:read`	`200` with safe subject metadata

Responses for protected admin routes use no-store cache headers. Passwords and password hashes are not returned.

OIDC browser routes:

Route	Behavior
`GET /admin/auth/login`	Redirects to the IdP with state, nonce, and PKCE.
`GET /admin/auth/callback`	Verifies the OIDC response and creates a server-side session.
`GET /admin/auth/me`	Returns safe metadata for the active Basic or OIDC admin identity.
`POST /admin/auth/logout`	Deletes the server-side session and expires the admin cookie.

Invalid or missing sessions return 401. Valid sessions without a matching Casbin policy receive endpoint-specific 403 responses such as reports-forbidden.

Smoke Tests

Missing credentials should challenge:

curl -i "$ROUTER_BASE_URL/admin/auth/check"

Example response:

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Cache-Control: no-store
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="GenAI Smart Router Admin", charset="UTF-8"

Invalid credentials return the same status without revealing which field was wrong:

curl -i -u admin:wrong-password "$ROUTER_BASE_URL/admin/auth/check"

Valid credentials with the current stub permission return safe subject metadata:

curl -i -u admin:replace-with-the-admin-password "$ROUTER_BASE_URL/admin/auth/check"

Example response:

{
  "ok": true,
  "source": "basic",
  "subject": "basic:admin",
  "domain": "example/prod"
}

If the password is valid but admin:auth:read is not granted, the endpoint returns:

{
  "error": {
    "type": "admin-forbidden",
    "message": "admin-forbidden"
  }
}

Casbin Authorization For Admin Reports

Browser-admin Basic Auth and OIDC sessions establish identity only. Admin reports use Casbin policy under server.admin_auth.authorization for authorization decisions. The same authorization layer checks /metrics and content-capture maintenance for caller-token subjects.

server:
  admin_auth:
    authorization:
      enabled: true
      source: static
      policy_file: ""
      policy:
        - g, caller:ops-metrics-key, metrics_admin, example/prod
        - g, caller:content-admin-key, content_admin, example/prod
        - g, basic:admin, reports_admin, example/prod
        - g, user:alice@example.com, reports_admin, example/prod
        - p, metrics_admin, example/prod, metrics, read
        - p, content_admin, example/prod, content:capture, delete|purge
        - p, reports_admin, example/prod, admin:reports, read|export|drilldown

The report surface checks object admin:reports with action read for pages, aggregate JSON APIs, and static assets. Markdown export checks action export. Request detail under /admin/reports/api/request/<request_id> and request evidence under /admin/reports/api/request-evidence?request_id=<request_id> check action drilldown.

Content-capture maintenance endpoints check object content:capture; delete-by-request uses action delete in the captured row's caller project/environment domain, and retention purge uses action purge. Existing content_admin: true caller entries receive compatible Casbin grants for their own domain at startup.

When reports are enabled under server.admin_reports, ordinary router caller tokens are rejected with 403 reports-forbidden rather than being treated as browser-admin credentials.

Normal model APIs continue to use router caller tokens:

curl "$ROUTER_BASE_URL/v1/models" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ROUTER_TOKEN"

Metrics continue to use caller tokens. Existing metrics_admin: true callers receive equivalent Casbin grants at startup:

curl "$ROUTER_BASE_URL/metrics" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $METRICS_ADMIN_ROUTER_TOKEN"

TLS Requirement

Production deployments should set allow_insecure_http: false. The router accepts Basic credentials only when the incoming request is HTTPS or when a configured trusted reverse proxy forwards X-Forwarded-Proto: https.

Only trusted proxy CIDRs are allowed to assert forwarded HTTPS:

server:
  admin_auth:
    basic:
      allow_insecure_http: false
      trusted_proxy_cidrs:
        - 127.0.0.1/32
        - 172.18.0.0/16

Use the actual reverse-proxy subnet for the deployment. Do not add broad networks unless the router is isolated from direct client traffic on those networks.

Use allow_insecure_http: true only for local development and loopback smoke tests.

Authorization Boundary

Basic Auth establishes a subject such as basic:admin; OIDC with subject_claim: email establishes a subject such as user:alice@example.com. Neither decides what that subject may do. Current stub-route permissions are intentionally small. Metrics and admin report authorization are expressed through the deployment's Casbin policy.

Equivalent policy expressed as separate Casbin permission lines:

g, basic:admin, reports_admin, example/prod
g, user:alice@example.com, reports_admin, example/prod
p, reports_admin, example/prod, admin:reports, read
p, reports_admin, example/prod, admin:reports, export
p, reports_admin, example/prod, admin:reports, drilldown

The username is not the authorization rule. The stable subject, domain, object, and action should be the policy inputs.

Rollback

Disable the affected browser identity method and restart the router:

server:
  admin_auth:
    basic:
      enabled: false
      users: []
    oidc:
      enabled: false

After Basic rollback, /admin/auth/check should return 404. After OIDC rollback, /admin/auth/login, /admin/auth/callback, /admin/auth/me, and /admin/auth/logout should return 404 unless another admin identity method handles the route. /v1/* model APIs and /metrics keep their existing token behavior.

Basic Auth Configuration​

OIDC Session Configuration​

Runtime Behavior​

Smoke Tests​

Casbin Authorization For Admin Reports​

TLS Requirement​

Authorization Boundary​

Rollback​